illusionism
Compiled with AI assistance and selectively reviewed. Please consult the cited passages; the books remain the authoritative source. About this companion
Editorial synthesis · provisional
Definition
Illusionism is the deflationary family of approaches that explains why experience seems to possess intrinsic, private and ineffable qualities without accepting those represented qualities as a further kind of fact. The corpus adopts this orientation while affirming that experience and seeming occur. It presents the stance as a philosophical wager, not an established result of neuroscience.
Explanation
AB situates the reframing among Ryle, Wittgenstein, Dennett and Frankish. The target is the supposed private quality beyond functional and physiological explanation, not every occurrence of awareness or the fact that things seem some way. RB2 asks why self-modeling animals represent their states as carrying an explanatory residue.
Frankish’s illusion problem names the resulting explanatory task. Chalmers’s meta-problem overlaps the question about judgments but does not endorse the illusionist verdict; it is a problem for every view. The corpus identifies the author’s decision to treat that explanatory work as the whole answerable problem.
Damasio’s verdict remains separate: his later physiological account aims to explain subjective experience itself, not reduce it to report. RB2 calls the author’s deflationary stance a wager and leaves open the opposing possibility that experience is a datum no functional account earns. The assessment retains that contest rather than resolving it editorially.
Scope and attribution
Preserve a contested philosophical main entry without declaring a scientific solution.
AB — The Actual Book
The deflationary tradition, opponents and Damasio’s distinct verdict are identified.
Occurrence locators: Notes: 241.
PB — The Possible Book
Inner-theater criticism and the formal meta-problem treatment are related but partial.
Occurrence locators: 100, 147.
RB1 — The Real Book, Volume I: The Possible Is Real
Source-verified occurrence; see the printed-page references below.
Occurrence locators: 162.
RB2 — The Real Book, Volume II: Becoming Is Being
The author denies an extra ineffable quality without denying experience or seeming.
Occurrence locators: 36, 37, 55.
Background used in the editorial explanation
Named theories and mechanisms are distinguished from neighboring background, homonyms and the author’s own synthesis. Reproduced AI passages retain their separate voice.